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WATER AGENCIES' DISTRIBUTION AND INEFFICIENCY UNDER
DIFFERENT DECISION RULES
Richard Howitt, Professor and Chair, Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of
California, Davis, One Shields Drive, Davis CA 95616, howitt@primal.ucdavis.edu,
530-752-1521
David Zetland, PhD Candidate, Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of California,
Davis, One Shields Drive, Davis CA 95616, david@primal.ucdavis.edu, 530-752-2092

Water management organizations often distribute water among members according to a political
decision function (e.g., voting, historical delivery, etc.) -- not economic functions of willingness
to pay or shadow values. As a result, scarce water supplies are lost to some members and found
by others, leading to, respectively, over-conservation or over-use of water by the members.
We find analytical equilibria with a two-player, game-theoretic model of optimal water
distribution under economic (base case) and different political allocation rules (historic
allocation, land-values, population, agricultural intensity) to measure the theoretical distortion of
each allocation compared to the base case. We then simulate model with n-players to examine
the effects of heterogeneous types and interactive influences with different parameter values. We
compare these results to the actual allocation of water between the 26 members of the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to estimate the distribution of costs and
benefits to MWD members under MWD's political allocation mechanism.
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How Inefficient Are Rules for Distributing and Pricing Water
at the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California?
Can We Improve on Them?
(Extended Abstract)
David Zetland
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) is a wholesale cooperative
mainly concerned with distributing both treated and untreated water from the State Water Project
(SWP) and Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA) to its 26 member agencies, who then redistribute
the water to customers or other water agencies.
In this paper, I demonstrate how the rules governing the quantity delivered and the price charged
in MWD-member transactions decrease overall efficiency. I develop inductive models of
quantity and price separately to reflect the fact that quantity and price are not jointly determined:
Quantity can be a function of administrative allocation, not price; price is often a function of
projected, not actual, quantity demanded.
For quantity, I use an analytical model to show how water allocation via preferential rights leads
risk-averse managers to underinvest in productive infrastructure. I also argue that the mere
presence of preferential rights—even if they are not exercised—can create the same effect.
For price, on the other hand, I show how MWD's current price schedule distorts signals to
conserve scarce water. The resulting increase in base demand and conveyance capacity leads to
higher volatility of quantity demanded. Misallocated resources and mismatched supply and
demand create inefficiency and pressure for expensive solutions that do not address the root
causes of the problem.
I conclude with a qualitative discussion of how markets might replace decision rules to increase
efficiency in quantity and price, while maintaining MWD's present engineering and
organizational structure. Although this paper is explicitly concerned with efficiency (ensuring
that scarce water supplies end up with those who value them most), equity considerations are
never far from the surface. The current rules for deciding quantity and prices are fair to some and
not to others; MWD's institutional structure could be the foundation of a framework combining
efficiency while transparently addressing equity. I suggest evolutionary steps to take MWD in
the right direction.
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